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Summary 
1. The research was carried out in Zambia in March 1996 under the Overseas 
Development Administration's Crop Post-Harvest Research Programme. It followed 
earlier desk research into outgrower schemes in Sub Saharan Africa (Stringfellow, 
February 1996). 
2. Two key findings of the desk research were that (i) the diversion of sales by 
outgrowers to alternative buyers has played a major role in undermining many 
schemes; and (ii) that lack of attention to the socio-economic issues that influence the 
participation of smallholders has also created problems. Both these factors have 
important implications for the successful design of outgrower schemes. Field research 
sought to establish to what degree the findings of the desk research were confirmed by 
the Zambian experience. 
3. In the last year or two many outgrower schemes have been established in Zambia, 
a development which has attracted considerable interest from the government and 
donors alike. Commodities involved are traditional smallholder export commodities 
(tobacco, cotton), new export crops (fresh vegetables, paprika, castor seed) and a 
range offood crops (maize, sunflower, soya, cowpea, groundnuts, sorghum). 
4. The emergence of these schemes appears to be related to political factors as well 
as efforts by commercial interests to exploit new export opportunities and efforts by 
donors to promote greater food security. 
5. The most significant scheme is Lonrho's cotton scheme at Mumbwa which 
involves 25,000 smallholders. The acquisition by Lonrho ofLINTCO, the former 
cotton parastatal, will increase the number of outgrowers to around 65,000. No other 
schemes are of comparable size. 
6. The prefinancing of smallholder maize production through the SGS/Cavmont 
scheme has created many outgrower schemes but as the rationale behind these has 
been_ political rather than commercial, their performance has been poor. 
7. Other schemes have been for food crops or high value export crops (mainly 
tobacco and paprika). Export vegetables are also produced under outgrower 
arrangements but the outgrowers are not smallholders, given the level of capital 
investment required to produce export quality vegetables. 
8. Interviews with scheme operators confirmed the findings of the desk study that 
diversion of sales are a major problem facing those implementing outgrower schemes. 
The response has been to develop a range of management systems to improve 
supervision of smallholders and minimise risk of diversion. Feelings were mixed 
about the usefulness of the new Agricultural Credit Act in this regard. 
9. A number of schemes have introduced peer group monitoring as a means to 
improve supervision. Bonuses for achieving high repayment levels are used to 
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increase incentives for group leaders and employees on a number of schemes. The 
concentration of growers in one area has also been used to improve supervision as 
well as cut down transaction costs. 
10. The most significant strategy adopted by traders/processors promoting 
production of low value and food commodities under outgrower arrangements has 
been to reduce their exposure by confining their assistance to the provision of seed 
and extension advice. This is also a response to the established pattern of diversion of 
fertiliser away from the outgrower crop to maize. 
11. Lonrho is taking this approach one step further by introducing a production 
system which effectively substitutes a higher labour input from the smallholder for 
purchased inputs, thus passing more of the production risk back to the smallholder. 
Despite positive early results, it is too soon to comment on the likely success of this 
strategy as the impact it will have on patterns of labour allocation within the 
household is not yet known. 
12. Another response to the problem of fertiliser diversion has been the introduction 
of outgrower rotation packages which provide fertiliser for the maize crop, to be 
followed by another commodity (cotton, soya, cowpea) which uses the residual 
fertiliser in the soil. 
12. This author's analysis suggests however that the long term viability of outgrower 
schemes for low value food crops is doubtful. As marketing systems develop for both 
the supply of seed and the marketing of outputs, smallholders will no longer need to 
rely on a contract with a trader to get access to the services they need. For their part, 
traders and processors will be able to purchase on the open market without the costs 
of administering a scheme. However in the short term, as Zambia's agricultural base 
is adjusting to the liberalised environment, outgrower schemes of the kind outlined in 
9. above may have an important role to play. 
13. The situation is different for higher value export commodities requiring high 
extension and capital inputs. Success requires institutional mechanisms which can 
rein:(orce the mutual interest that the buyer and the smallholder have in co-operation. 
A consensual approach to management is crucial. To date tobacco outgrower schemes 
have had a poor history in Zambia and efforts to introduce paprika among outgrowers 
have had little success, suggesting that insufficient attention has been given to 
developing the necessary business relationship between the two parties involved. 
14. Given the above, the continuing importance of outgrower arrangements in 
Zambian agriculture, beyond the present transition period, will depend to a large 
degree on the ability of scheme operators to find ways of creating the kind of business 
partnership with smallholders which will guarantee their co-operation. Donors may be 
able to assist in this process by providing technical assistance and training for farmer 
organisations and by assisting in the design of financing systems which spread the 
prefinancing risk between the smallholder, investor and a financial institution. 
Venture capital funds may also assist new investors should the conservatism of the 
commercial banking system block new investments. 
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Smallholder outgrower schemes in Zambia 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and objectives 
Field research in Zambia on outgrower schemes was carried out in March 1996 
following preliminary desk research at NRl on the experience of outgrower schemes 
in Sub Saharan Africa (R. Stringfellow, 1996). This was undertaken as part of the 
British Overseas Development Administration's Crops Post-Harvest Research 
Programme which is managed by NRI. 
Outgrower schemes are receiving increasing attention as potentially important private 
sector suppliers of agricultural services (input supply, extension, marketing, financial 
services) to smallholders and as an important means of promoting agricultural 
diversification. The desk research drew on the evidence of previous schemes to 
highlight the factors which have influenced their performance. 
Two key findings of the desk research were that (i) the diversion of sales by 
outgrowers to alternative buyers has played a major role in undermining many 
schemes; and (ii) that lack of attention to the socio-economic issues that influence the 
participation of smallholders has also created problems. 
With regard to (i), the research suggested that entrepreneurs have responded to the 
problem of diversion in a variety of ways. The most common is to control the 
market for the commodity. This can be achieved by introducing a new crop for 
which there are no other buyers in the area; introducing a crop which is not edible or 
amenable to local processing and sale; or selecting an area for operation which is 
inaccessible to competing buyers. Another approach is for the entrepreneur to reduce 
his/her exposure to the risk of default by limiting services to growers to the 
provision of inputs without advancing credit; by asking for security from outgrowers 
or by introducing a credit register. Intensive monitoring of participants especially 
at harvest time is another strategy. 
These three approaches are all based on the idea of controlling the smallholder. A 
complementary approach is for the entrepreneur to create such strong incentives for 
the smallholder to remain within the scheme that he/she prefers not to divert sale of 
output to another buyer. Such a consensual approach involves effective 
management through the timely provision of services, prompt and fair payment and a 
good understanding of the smallholder's perception of the scheme. 
With regard to (ii), key issues which were often left out of project design were those 
relating to the availability of labour (gender distribution of agricultural tasks within 
the household; seasonal patterns of agricultural labour, including outmigration); the 
priority attached by smallholders to the production of food crops over cash crops; 
the opportunity costs of producing the new commodity for the household and the 
household's increased exposure to risk as a result of adopting the new crop. 
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Information on the response of entrepreneurs to the problems created as a result was 
relatively scarce. 
Complete Terms of Reference for the field research are provided in Appendix 1. In 
summary form, these were to establish whether recent experience of outgrower 
schemes has been consistent with the findings of the desk research and to highlight 
any innovative and effective responses to the problems of crop diversion and socio-
economic constraints by scheme operators. 
Support for the research was provided by the Zambian National Farmers Union which 
facilitated contact with scheme operators and participants. 
1.2 Methodology 
In country research lasted 3 weeks. Relevant reports and other sources of 
information, including interviews with scheme operators and others with outgrower 
experience (for a list, see Appendix 2) were used to develop an overview of outgrower 
schemes in Zambia and an impression of the degree to which the issues highlighted in 
previous NRI research are consistent with Zambian experience. 
From this information a few schemes were selected for more detailed study. A 
detailed questionnaire was used to extract information on the design and operation of 
the scheme (Appendix 3) and where possible, a number of participating farmers were 
interviewed. 
2. An overview of outgrower schemes in Zambia 
2.1 The rationale behind outgrower schemes 
In the last year or two many outgrower schemes have been established in Zambia, a 
development which has attracted considerable interest from the government and 
donors alike1. Commodities involved are traditional smallholder export cominodities 
(tobacco, cotton), new export crops (fresh vegetables, paprika, castor seed) and a 
· range of food crops (maize, sunflower, soya, cowpea, groundnuts, sorghum). 
The impetus behind different schemes has varied with the commodities involved. In 
the case of maize, the establishment of outgrower schemes through the Cavmont/SGS 
scheme has been a response more to political imperatives than economic ones, as the 
poor economic performance of the scheme suggests (see discussion of the 
SGS/Cavmont scheme below). 
The establishment of outgrower schemes in other commodities, particularly cotton 
and tobacco, follows the more conventional logic that smallholders have a 
comparative advantage in the production of these commodities due to the labour 
intensive nature of their production. 
1 During the author's visit in March two other donor funded teams were in the country looking at 
issues of agribusiness development, including outgrow er schemes - a Cargill Technical Services Team 
funded by USAID and a World Bank mission. The author met with the Cargill team on several 
occasions but was not able to meet the World Bank consultants. During the same period a Ministry of 
Agriculture team was conducting an evaluation of the Cavrnont/SGS fertiliser credit scheme. 
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Zambia's maize monoculture, inheritance ofthe previous government's agricultural 
policy, is a third important factor. Liberalisation and political changes in South Africa 
have provided many new opportunities for agricultural trade both within and outside 
Zambia. But whilst demand exists, traders are finding that supply is limited given 
producers' attachment to maize. To increase supply, and in the absence of an 
effective government extension service, traders need to provide the seeds, extension 
advice and marketing infrastructure necessary to induce smallholders to diversify. 
Outgrower schemes are an institutional arrangement to achieve this. 
Another aspect of diversification, and one expressed by several traders interviewed 
during the course of this research, is the obligation they feel to assist farmers to 
benefit from new opportunities. Donors are keen to encourage this attitude, especially 
where diversification can bring improvements in food security and household 
nutrition. At a workshop organised by the UNDP/GRZ/F AO's Integrated Crop 
Management/Food Legume Project in September last year collaboration between 
traders and farmers was a central theme (UNDP/GRZ/F AO, 1995). The EU funded 
Kabwe Smallholders Programme has taken the same approach and in March 1996 
organised a meeting between traders and farmers representatives to discuss ways in 
which they could work together. It has also made available funds from the 
programme's marketing credit fund to entrepreneurs wishing to establish outgrower 
schemes (see below). 
2.2 Recent research on outgrower schemes and the need for complementary 
research on success factors 
A recent study on outgrower schemes in Zambia for the World Bank (Mano 
Consultancy (draft), 1995) provides useful information on their nature and 
performance. The objective of the study was to provide a better understanding of 
outgrowing and its implications for Zambian agriculture. Scheme managers were 
identified and information requested from them on a variety of issues including the 
selection of commodities and locations for schemes, scale of operations, services 
provided to farmers, farmer obligations, management structure and fmancing, 
marketing and processing arrangements. An analysis of the performance of different 
schemes was also attempted. 
In its conclusions, the study addressed itself to issues of agricultural policy, 
highlighting areas where government action could assist the establishment of 
outgrower schemes. Legal and institutional innovations to facilitate the enforcement 
of contracts, government investment in rural infrastructure and the provision of "soft" 
money to those wishing to establish schemes were all recommended. Further research 
was also recommended on the impact of schemes on farming households, the 
environment, farming systems and the local rural economy to establish the efficacy of 
outgrower schemes in promoting sustainable agricultural and economic development. 
These are all interesting recommendations which merit further consideration. A 
complementa..ry approach is to take a more critical view of the operation of schemes 
themselves in order to extract information about the characteristics of successful 
schemes and to learn the lessons of failed efforts. Given the perennial problems of 
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crop diversion and scheme design highlighted in previous NRI research on outgrower 
schemes, information of this kind should be of particular use to those wishing to 
establish outgrower schemes themselves, or to those evaluating funding proposals for 
outgrower schemes. It is hoped that by focusing on these areas, the present study will 
complement research already carried out in Zambia. 
2.3 Major outgrower programmes in Zambia 
Cotton: Lonrho and the new Cotton Entrepreneurs 
Lonrho established an outgrower scheme in Zambia for the production of cotton in 
1992 following the complete liberalisation of the sector. It had been operating its own 
ginnery since 1986 and the aim in setting up its own outgrower scheme was to ensure 
sufficient volumes of seed cotton to supply the ginnery. Studies were done to 
compare the merits of operating its own cotton estates or operating an outgrower 
scheme and it was concluded that due to the high costs of in:frastructural development, 
as well as quality advantages associated with manually harvested cotton, the 
company would invest in the smallscale sector. A 25,000 ha model was established 
based on the World Bank Training and Visit scheme with 15,000 smallscale 
outgrowers each growing 1-2 ha of cotton, sufficient in a normal year to supply the 
ginnery. 
The Lonrho model has proved highly successful (details of the operation of the 
scheme are given in Sections 3 and 4). However despite its success in managing its 
outgrower programme, the company has decided to gradually withdraw from direct 
managerial involvement, passing this responsibility to smaller intermediary 
companies which it will prefinance and from which it will purchase the raw cotton. 
Lonrho's recent acquisition of the former cotton parastatal, LINTCO, is a major factor 
in this decision as it has increased the number of smallholders under the company to 
about 65,000. Management considers this to be a number far beyond what it can 
efficiently manage. Furthermore, the company believes that its comparative 
advantage lies not in managing smallholders, which is essentially an administrative 
task, but in research and development, financing and trading. It believes that it is 
therefore logical to refocus its resources in these areas, leaving smaller operators, who 
have _the advantage of local knowledge and greater flexibility, to manage the 
smallholders. 
This is a recent policy decision and to date only a few entrepreneurs have established 
themselves in the new role. One of these is Cotmark which operates in Central and 
Eastern Province. Its operations in Eastern Province were visited during fieldwork. 
The SGS/Cavmont Agricultural Credit Management Programme 
This is a publicly funded programme under private sector management to supply 
agricultural inputs to smallholders. SGS Zambia and Cavmont Merchant Bank were 
appointed by the government in the 1994/95 season and again in the 1995/96 season 
to distribute for cash or on credit government and donated stocks of maize seed and 
fertilisers through a network of private entrepreneurs. They were required to recruit 
the entrepreneurs (known as credit co-ordinators), monitor their performance and 
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ensure repayment for inputs advanced. In the 1995/96 season SGS recruited 79 credit 
co-ordinators, each on-lending to between 50 and 1,000 farmers. 
Although the programme itself is not an outgrower scheme, what it has created in 
effect are many privately operated outgrower schemes. According to SGS, only 1% 
of inputs were distributed for cash in 1995/96. In return for pre-financing farmers, 
credit co-ordinators have therefore made agreements with smallholders that they will 
sell back their crop to them. Similar arrangements operated in the 1994/95 season but 
repayment was very poor. Credit co-ordinators repaid SGS only 4.2% of the amount 
advanced. This poor performance has been attributed to drought, late distribution of 
inputs and political interference. Cavmont, which operated in provinces less affected 
by drought, managed about 40% repayment. 
In the 1995/96 ~eason SGS claims that it has tightened up its selection and monitoring 
operations and many of the previous year's credit co-ordinators have been dropped. A 
target level of 60% repayment has been set. But whilst this would represent a very 
substantial improvement on last year's performance, it will not make the scheme 
financially viable. As a rough illustration, bearing in mind that it was maize 
production that was fmanced and the value of fertilisers per hectare for maize will 
account for approximately 50% of the value of the crop at harvest2, the 60% target 
will only just cover the value of the inputs supplied. The balance will not be 
sufficient to pay producers for their labour, meet all management and supervision 
costs and provide a reasonable margin for the credit co-ordinators and SGS/Cavmont. 
The implication is that even with all the disciplines provided by the private sector, a 
programme to pre-finance rainfed hybrid maize requires subsidy. Critiques of the 
scheme have given little attention to this issue, preferring to cite political interference 
and misuse of resources as the main source of the scheme's problems (see the 
Zambian Farmer, February 1996). But the intrinsic problems associated with 
financing rainfed production of a food crop are evident in the experience of credit co-
ordinators who did distribute fertiliser to producers as required by the programme. 
Drought was a major contributor to the repayment problem but so was the difficulty of 
getting farmers to sell back to them when they had the option of either retaining 
production for home consumption, taking it to a local hammer mill or marketing it 
through another trader. As one credit co-ordinator explained, even with a big 
monitoring effort she only expects to purchase 50% of the production she has 
fmanced this year. Or in the words of another co-ordinator, who estimated that 80% 
of the crop she financed was sold to other traders, "maize is a very bad crop for 
outgrowers". 
This view is entirely consistent with experience elsewhere. In the face of a well 
developed market for a commodity, outgrower relationships are difficult to maintain. 
But in Zambia the rural population's continuing dependence on hybrid maize has 
created political pressure for the extension of the old policy of institutional credit, 
with SGS' s and Cavmont' s participation providing the private sector fig leaf behind 
2 This assumes a fertiliser price per bag of K 17,000, 8 bags of fertiliser per hectare and a yield of 25 
bags per hectare with an int:r-mill value at harvest ofK12,000 each. 
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which the government can hide. In a period of economic transition, the decision to 
continue subsidising producers by other means may be the right one in the short term, 
but from a longer term perspective, if it weakens incentives to diversify out of hybrid 
maize production and develop more appropriate farming systems, it may not be so 
beneficial. 
The scheme has not required credit co-ordinators exclusively to pre-finance maize 
production. Fertiliser has been used mainly for maize because that is what 
smallholders want to grow. In the scheme's second year of operation, a number of 
credit co-ordinators have introduced other commodities (castor, cotton, cowpea, 
sunflower, soya) for which markets are less developed and input requirements are 
less. Some have combined this with intensified selection, monitoring and supervision 
of smallholders to further minimise risk. Thus despite first appearances, the scheme 
may be playing a useful role in promoting diversification among a very reluctant 
smallholder population. 
Kabwe Smallholder Development Programme 
For the 1995/96 season the Kabwe Smallholder's Development Programme (KSDP) 
invited prospective outgrower scheme operators to submit applications for funding to 
the Programme's Marketing Credit Fund. The conditions set down by the programme 
were that the schemes should provide inputs, technical advice and marketing services 
to smallholders. Funds were not be used to finance maize as a major objective was to 
promote diversification. Loans were made for an eleven month term at an interest rate 
5% below that of the Barclays Base Rate. Two hundred per cent security was 
demanded. Scheme operators were required to draw up written contracts with all 
farmers in which the obligations of both parties were clearly set out in compliance 
with the 1995 Agricultural Credit Act. This would commit the farmer to repaying the 
loan with interest and selling all his crop to the scheme operator and would commit 
the scheme operator to providing specified services to the farmer. 
Eight schemes were funded with numbers of participating farmers ranging from 40 to 
400 per scheme. Commodities included were cotton, sorghum, sunflower and 
. soybeans. Interestingly all the scheme operators were supplying fertiliser for maize to 
their. farmers, although under the conditions of the KSDP this cost could not be met 
from project funds. The implication is that a diversification strategy has to include 
maize rather than substitute it, a finding consistent with other schemes examined 
during fieldwork (this theme is developed in Section 4). 
As repayment is not due for several months and this is only the first year of their 
operations, it is too early to judge the success or otherwise of schemes funded under 
the KSDP. The officer monitoring the schemes on behalf of the Programme did 
observe that the quality of supervision provided by scheme operators was variable 
with some providing their own field officers whilst others had simply left seed and 
other inputs with government extension officers, expecting them to provide all the 
necessary supervision to farmers. Another observation was that little fertiliser was 
being used on the new commodities as farmers were continuing to prioritise maize 
production. On the question of contract compliance, the officer had heard many 
farmers expressing some confusion about what they actually owed the scheme 
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operators (some contracts had not included the value of inputs and any interest 
charges due) and had even expressed reluctance to commit themselves to selling all 
their crop to the company that had financed them on the basis that if another trader 
offered a better price, why should they not sell to him? Other farmers were known to 
have received financing from more than one scheme. Early indications therefore are 
that these new schemes are likely to encounter the same problems common to other 
schemes elsewhere. 
The UNDPIGRZIFAO 's Integrated Crop Management/Food Legume Project and 
other legume outgrower schemes 
Although not an outgrower programme itself, the UNDP/GRZ/FAO project, which 
seeks to promote legume production and utilisation among smallholders in order to 
improve household food security, has provided technical assistance and support to a 
number of outgrower schemes producing legume seed. Commercial seed companies 
have not been very interested in multiplying improved varieties of legume seed in 
Zambia because legumes are self-pollinated limiting demand for new seed to a level 
which does not justify substantial commercial investment. However to ensure that 
sufficient seed is produced to meet a growing demand among smallholders, the 
project is supplying training in seed multiplication through a programme in 30 
districts of the country. Following training, some seed growers have set up their own 
outgrower schemes. In Kaoma, one farmer has contracted I 0 outgrowers each 
growing I ha of cowpea seed. She undertakes the extension work herself and supplies 
all the inputs on credit to farmers. In Katete Cotmark, a company operating a cotton 
outgrower scheme, has received assistance from the project for selected farmers who 
are multiplying soya and groundnut seed. Next season the company hopes to 
distribute this seed among many more of its outgrowers for commercial production. 
Two other new schemes under which cowpeas are being produced this season are in 
Southern Province (Advance Seed Limited) and in Chipata (IMPI Agriculture Ltd). 
Production is intended for commercial sale with a strong demand identified both 
domestically and in the southern African region. 
In Northern Province a private company, Solye Enterprise, has 167 smallholders 
growing soybean for which they provide seed, extension support and a guaranteed 
market. The company has trained 30 processors to heat treat soya for processing at a 
central mill. The soya flour is then marketed throughout the country. 
A.fricare and sunflower production 
The Africare project bears much similarity to the UNDP/GRZ/F AO project discussed 
above in that its objective is essentially to improve food security among smallholder 
fanners by promoting the production and processing of alternative food crops to 
maize. It is not therefore an outgrower programme but through the promotion of the 
ram press which processes the sunflower seed into oil it has created a new demand for 
seed in areas where supply has been limited. Small outgrower schemes, often 
involving just a few local farmers, have been established by ram press operators who 
wish to ensure a regular supply of seed for processing. According to Africare staff, 
the small size of these schemes and the fact that the operator personally knows all the 
involved fanners has contributed to the success of such operations. 
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Africare' s success in promoting the ram press, combined with a run of poor seasons 
for sunflower due to the drought, has squeezed the supply of sunflower in the country, 
creating problems for the industrial oil millers. Some have responded by setting up 
their own outgrower schemes to secure supplies. Southern Oil Mills set up a scheme 
in 1995 involving some 50-60 fanners to whom it supplied seed (but not fertiliser). 
High Protein Foods in Mazabuka operates a scheme involving some 500 fanners, 
cultivating an area of about 2,500 ha. Although it has experienced problems of 
repayment and the diversion of inputs to other uses, the company remains committed 
to the scheme. Without it, it believes that it would not be able to source the oilseeds it 
requires for its mill. 
IMPI Agriculture in Chipata is also pre-fmancing sunflower production among 
smallholders this season and is in the process of drawing up a contract for sale with 
Lever Brothers in Malawi. 
Tobacco 
A number of outgrower schemes in tobacco are operating in Zambia (schemes were 
visited in Chipata and Serenje and there are others in Lundazi and Chama). However 
in contrast to the experience of Malawi, where tobacco is widely grown by 
smallholders under the estate system, smallholder outgrower schemes in Zambia have 
had a difficult history. Although tobacco shares certain characteristics with cotton 
which lend itself to smallholder production (it is labour intensive and is an export crop 
with limited local demand) it is a commodity requiring much greater skill, both in pre 
and post harvest operations, and a much greater outlay of capital because of high 
fertiliser requirements. Therefore if grown under outgrower conditions, it requires 
intensive management and supervision. 
The projects in Chipata and Serenje have recently come under new management. It is 
too early to judge whether greater attention to managerial issues will result in 
improved performance but a number of strategies that the new management teams are 
currently implementing or are considering are discussed in Section 3 below. 
Papr_ika 
Paprika has been recently introduced into Zambia by Cheetah Zambia Ltd which is 
investing in state of the art processing equipment for the commodity. The company 
has identified a strong market in Europe for paprika which is the second most 
important spice in world markets. Paprika shares similar production characteristics to 
tobacco, requiring skilled husbandry before and after harvesting and large amounts of 
fertiliser. It is highly labour intensive. 
In the production of the commodity, the company would like to operate a system 
similar to that currently being introduced by Lonrho which would involve contracting 
intermediaries to manage groups of smallholders, leaving the company to focus its 
resources on processing and trading. With each smallholder cultivating about 0.25 ha 
(the recommended area for one smallholder unit) the company would require groups 
of at least 40 farmers with a total cropping area of 10 ha within a 5 mile radius. These 
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represent the minimum conditions, given transport and extension costs, for a viable 
investment. 
This approach has worked in Malawi but in Zambia neither commercial farmers nor 
traders have put themselves forward as intermediaries, despite extensive efforts by the 
company to promote the arrangement. As a result only a handful of smallholders are 
growing paprika in Zambia (in contrast to Malawi where 750 smallholders are 
growing paprika this season). 
Export vegetables 
In the last few years Zambia has entered the market for the export of fresh flowers and 
vegetables to Europe. Loans from the European Investment Bank and the European 
Export Development Fund have assisted this process. The two major farms supplying 
these markets are York Farm and Agriflora, both of which are located near the airport. 
Their success has created more demand than they can supply and as a result they are 
contracting outgrowers to increase output. However the industry requires high levels 
of capital investment in order to produce and maintain products at quality standards 
acceptable in European supermarkets, requiring outgrowers to invest in expensive 
infrastructure (refrigerated vans, packing sheds). This has excluded smallholders 
from entering production. 
The Chief Executive of the Zambia Export Growers Association sees possible future 
potential in certain horticultural commodities which require intensive labour input 
(fme green beans being one such commodity which has been produced under 
smallholder outgrower arrangements in several African countries). He suggested that 
in these cases aid funds could be used to "prime the pump", a justified expenditure 
given the potential social benefits from involving smallholders. At the moment 
however ZEGA is not involved in any projects of this kind. 
In Chipata one entrepreneur is promoting birds eye chillies among outgrowers. He 
has identified a market in Malawi and has some 40 ha under cultivation this year. 
Relatively low input costs combine with a high labour requirement to recommend it as 
a suitable outgrower crop. · 
2.4 Production and marketing characteristics of commodities grown under 
outgrower arrangements in Zambia 
Before discussing selected issues relating to the design and management of outgrower 
schemes in Zambia, a summary is provided in Table 1 of some of the commodities 
currently under outgrower production with details of their major characteristics in 
relation to production and marketing. As will become apparent in Section 3, these 
characteristics play a major role in determining the outcome of outgrower schemes. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of a number of outgrowet· crops in Zambia3 
commodity production characteristics marketing characteristics 
croppiug croppiug requiremeuts cost of expected expected expected value cost of edible locally uatioual/ 
cycle purchased average value per lla perlla purchased processe1ll export markets 
iuputs per lm smallllo/iler l.farmgate 1. iuto-mill iuputs as traded 
yield per lla (kg) price price/price paid to %of 
trader(if uot expect ell 
processed ill output 
Zambia) value 
(trader 
price) 
maize Planted Requires adequate seed : 25 bags K 10,000 X (into-mill price) 53% yes yes- within Zambia 
Nov./Dec. ; moisture as susceptible to K 20,000 25 K 12,000 X 25 hanunennills maize flow 
harvested drought; ploughing = 250,000 = 300,000 increasingly from surplus to 
May/ June unless under minimum fertiliser: widespread in deficit areas; 
tillage system; 3 8 bags@ all areas; cross border 
weedings K 17,500 widely traded - trade in 
= K 140,000 density of outlying areas 
trading network (to Zaire, 
TOTAL= varies with Angola ete) 
K 160,000 location 
cotton Planted Diligent pest control; Lonrho cost 650 kg K 300 X 650 (raw cotton, into- Lonrho: no 5 g1nneries in domestic textile 
Nov./Dec.; regular weeding; estimate = K 195,000 mill price) 8% Zambia, 3 industry 
harvested harvesting - labour (K 25,000) K 450 X 650 owned by limited; 
May/ June intensive - 2 ha well below = K 292,500 LINTCO : Lonrho; majority of 
maximum for average LINT CO 22% growing cotton traded 
smallholder (K 63,000) numbers of internationally 
buyers 
competing to 
buy seed cotton 
but limited 
competition in 
processing 
sunflower Planted Late planting reduces seed (record) (a) With (a) 30 x 50kg (into-mill price) (a) 32% yes yes - growing oil milling in 
Dec./Jan; yield; should be planted =K 4,000; fertiliser and bags@ K60- (a) 30 bags numbers of ram the larger towns 
harvested in rows; weed control, fertiliser (6 good 80,000 = @KI0-12,000 = presses in rural -need to 
April esp. in first 4 weeks; less bags)= management Kl80- K300-360,000 areas compete with 
moisture sensitive than K\05,000 = 1500 kg 240,000 encouraging cheap imported 
maize (b) Without (b) 10 bags@ (b) 5-7% greater trade in oil (e.g. soya 
fertiliser and KI0-12,000 per sunflower from South 
with poor bag= KIOO- Africa) 
management (b) I 0 x 120,000 
= 500 kg 50kg bags 
@ K6-8,000 
per bag= 
K60-80,000 
-------
3 Infonnation for this table was collected from a wide variety of sources consulted during fieldwork. Its purpose is to provide a .rough indication of the economic factors influencing the 
outcome of outgrower schemes using the best infonnation available at the time of fieldwork. Fanngate and inter-mill prices used are the expected prices given by trading companies at the 
beginning of the 1996 marketing season. Where necessary, prices were converted to kwacha using the March 1996 exchange rate (US $1 = K 1 090). 
14 
commodity production charRcteristics marketing characteristics 
croppi11g croppi11g req11ireme11ts cost of expect eel expected expected val11e cost of eclible locally 11atio11all 
cycle p11rcllased average val11eper /la per /la p11rclrasecl processed/ export markets 
i11p11ts per /la smallllolder 1. farmgate 2. iuto-mill i11p11ts as traded 
yield per /la (kg) price price/price paicl to %of 
trader expected 
011tp11t 
val11e 
(trader 
price) 
cow pea Planted Dec.; Good rains can cause seed:- (a) With (a) 11 bags (a) 1000 kg (a) 12% yes not widely regional 
harvested aphid problems; K 10,795 fertiliser: 1000 @ Kl8,000 @K250 consumed in markets in 
from March requires I or 2 minimal kg = K 198,000 = K 250,000 Zambia- Angola, 
weedings; susceptible fertiliser traditional Mozambique;-
to weevil infestation required: I varieties grown Zambia has the 
after harvest; drought bag@ more for leaves best seed 
resistant - 300 mm K17,500; (b) Without (b) 8 bags (b) 700 kg (b) 7% varieties in the . 
minimum rainfall; fixes aphid fertiliser: 700 kg @ K 18,000 @K250 region, 
nitrogen treatment: = K 144,000 = K 175,000 therefore 
KI,OOO; demand for 
seed 
TOTAL: 
K 29,000 I 
sorghum Planted Dec.; I or 2 weedings -once seed: K (a) With (a) 28 bags (a) 2500 kg @ K (a) 24% yes yes- can be used in the 
harvested established competes 2,850 fertiliser: 2500 @K8,000 120 processed in production of 
May/June well against weeds; fertiliser: 4 kg =K222,000 = K300,000 hammermills beer; export 
susceptible to bird bags@ markets in 
damage before harvest K 17,500 (b) Without (b) ll bags (b) 1000 kg@ K (b) 3% Botswana, 
=K 70,000 fertiliser: @K8,000 120 Namibia and 
TOTAL 1000kg = K 88,000 =K 120,000 South Africa 
(a) with 
fertiliser 
= K 73,350 
(b) without 
fertiliser 
=K2,850 
castor Annual and Requires only one seed : 1200 kg n/a K 260/kg 14% no very limited limited 
perennial; weeding; adds nutrients K20,000 = K 312,000 local demand domestic 
planted to soil fertiliser: (though TAZ demand; 
Dec./Jan; I bag= building new export markets 
harvested 17500 processing in Zimbabwe ! 
June/July TOTAL plant) 
=K 37,500 
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commodity production characteristics marketing characteristics 
cropping cropping requirements cost of expected expected expected value cost of edible locally 11atio11al/ 
cycle pure/rased average value per lla per lla (96 purclrasetl processed/ export markets 
i11puts per lra small/wider (96 llarvest) llarvest) i11p11ts as traded 
yield per lla (kg) 1. farmgate 2. irrto-mi/1 %of 
price price/price paid to expected 
tratler 011tp11t 
value 
(trader 
price) 
tobacco Transplanted Requires intensive and 12 bags IOOOkg Prices vary K 1,500/kg- 21% no some petty Cl·op sold 
in Nov.; skilled labour- seedling fertiliser@ significantly KI ,SOO,OOO trading to through TAZ to 
reaping preparation; K 17,500= by grade- supply limited Zimbabwe 
March/ April; transplanting; pest and K210,000; in 1996, domestic market 
curing March- nematode control; seed and Chipata 
May suckering; reaping; chemicals= prices by 
curing; grading; 0.5 ha Kl4,000 grade varied 
maximum for average TOTAL= from K200-
smallholder 314,000 K2,000/kg 
paprika Transplanted Requires intensive and K 480,000 IOOOkg K490 K 1,635 X 1000 30% no no indigenous Good export 
at the skilled labour- seedling (using = Kl,635,000 use as it is a market and 
beginning of preparation; Cheetah's new crop Cheetah 
the rains; transplanting; pest costings pioneering 
harvested after control; harvesting; minus labour processing; 
the rains at 7- drying; de-stalking and costs) some 
14 day de-seeding; baling; 0.25 competing 
intervals ha for average traders 
smallholder. Minimum emerging 
rainfall requirement 
800mm 
-
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3. Constraints and strategies to overcome them: (1) Diversion of sales 
The diversion of sales by smallholders to other traders was a concern to all scheme 
operators interviewed during the course of the research. In this section the strategies 
adopted by them to overcome this constraint are reviewed. 
3.1 Controlling the market for the commodity 
Introducing a new crop 
By introducing a new crop into a country or region the entrepreneur has the certainty 
of knowing that smallholders have no alternative marketing channel at harvest. 
Whiterose Farms, which introduced castor seed to outgrowers in 1995, believes this is 
an important factor in the success of its scheme (castor grows wild in Zambia but has 
not been commercially produced before). When IMPI Agriculture introduced birds 
eye chillies to its farmers in Chipata it knew that they would be dependent on the 
company for finding a market. Cheetah Zambia had the same advantage of facing no 
competitors when it introduced paprika into the country a few years ago. 
Of course the advantage of market leadership can be short lived: if a commodity is 
introduced successfully it will encourage others to enter the market and competition 
for sales will develop. Cheetah is already facing this problem as traders move in to 
try and purchase paprika that it has financed4• To safeguard its investment, it will 
have to adopt other strategies. 
From the farmer's perspective, competition among buyers is positive. But where this 
competition undermines existing contracts between buyers and producers, outgrower 
type arrangements which involve pre-financing are likely to disappear. For 
commodities with minimal extension and input requirements, the impact on the 
producer may be limited if he is able to fmance and manage his own production. But 
where these requirements are considerable, as in paprika production, the smallholder 
is likely to find that he can no longer afford to produce the commodity. 
Co-operation among buyers 
Another strategy open to buyers is to try and co-operate with competitors. This can 
take the form of agreeing not to buy from producers financed by competitors and 
could extend to agreeing a common price. 
As noted above, the restructuring of the cotton industry in Zambia is creating a 
situation where there is much more competition at the farm level for cotton sales. 
According to a number of sources, the companies involved are already passing 
information to each other on the farmers they have prefinanced and are negotiating on 
operational zones for each company. Despite this, there is evidence in Kabwe that 
individual smallholders have received financing from several different sources for this 
season. 
4 Under the 1995 Agricultural Credit Act this is illegal. To the extent that it can be enforced, the Act 
will assist entrepreneurs like Cheetah but many of those interviewed feared that ithe Act would be 
difficult to enforce given the difficulty of monitoring smallholders and the expected delays in bringing 
legal action. 
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Since taking over LINTCO early this year Lonrho has acquired considerable control 
over prices. As it now owns all three cotton ginneries in the centre of the country, it 
sets the prevailing into mill price for Central and Southern Provinces (Clarke Cotton, 
a South African company, purchased the ginnery in Chipata but the distance between 
this and the Lonrho ginneries is likely to eliminate any incentive for traders to take 
advantage of price differentials). This will limit the degree to which traders at the 
fanngate can adjust their prices to compete for purchases. Lonrho' s market power can 
be seen therefore to have a similar effect to a pricing agreement. 
Managers of tobacco schemes in Chipata are also considering exchanging 
information on the farmers they have financed as well as demarcating operational 
zones to assist with marketing. 
Financing a crop with limited local demand 
As well as alternative marketing channels, alternative uses for a crop present the 
scheme operator with a higher risk of crop diversion. By introducing a crop which is 
inedible (castor bean, cotton, tobacco) or which is not customarily consumed or 
processed (soya, cowpea) a scheme operator is able to reduce the risk. 
In the latter case however it is likely that over time the greater availability of the 
commodity in an area will lead to a change in consumption patterns and the 
development of local demand. This process will be hastened if new processing 
technologies become available. Both the Africare programme for sunflower and the 
F AO/GRZ!UNDP legumes programme are already having an impact on local 
consumption patterns by promoting through processing the domestic consumption of 
commodities traditionally viewed as cash crops. With time, it is likely that local 
marketing systems will develop for these commodities to the extent that prefinancing 
arrangements will become difficult to sustain. 
Operating in a remote location with poor trading links 
One of the factors contributing to the success of Sol ye Enterprises, which processes 
. locally produced soya, has been its location. As the area is isolated, options for 
diversion of sales are limited and by adding value through processing the company is 
able to offset the high transport costs involved in marketing the commodity. 
3.2 Minimising exposure to the risk of default 
Limiting services to growers 
By limiting services to the delivery of inputs without prefinancing them an 
entrepreneur is only exposed up to the value of transport and delivery costs incurred. 
Arguably this relationship between entrepreneur and producer it too slight to 
constitute an outgrower relationship but in Zambia it has emerged in the maize sector 
precisely because many traders have found any greater commitment to producers 
unsustainable for all the marketing risks already described. 
In the production of other commodities scheme operators have limited services to the 
prefmancing of seed but not fertiliser. Advance Seed Ltd has provided cowpea and 
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sorghum seed to 2-3,000 farmers in the Monze area on the basis of a written contract 
which commits the fanners to selling back the crop at harvest. For cowpea, the value 
of the seed represents about 7% of the expected value of the output (assuming no 
fertiliser is used in production) and for sorghum, 3%. Such low rates of exposure 
mean the company can sustain a degree of crop diversion. 
Not supplying fertilisers may have disadvantages in terms of yield. Advance Seed 
estimates that without fertiliser application, sorghum yields are reduced from 2,500 
kg/ha to 1,000 kg/ha. If the company is concerned with volume production then it 
will have to reach a much larger number of outgrowers, with all the additional 
administrative and transport costs, if it is to attain high levels of production. 
However for cowpea there is a much less marked trade-off in terms ofyield: without 
fertiliser these fall from around 1000 kg/ha to 700 kg/ha. Thus the trade-off between 
a risk minimisation strategy and operational costs appears to be far less significant 
than for sorghum. 
On the other hand there is no certainty that were the company to supply fertiliser, it 
would be used on the target commodity. Lonrho's prefinancing package for cotton 
does not include fertiliser although chemicals are included in addition to seed. 
Fertiliser would double yields if applied to cotton but the company's experience has 
been that when farmers receive fertiliser for cotton they will divert it to maize 
production and any yield advantage is lost. This confirms NRI findings elsewhere 
that smallholders often prioritise food crop production over cash crops. 
Selecting crops with low input requirements and drought tolerance 
The contrast in yield differentials between unfertilised and fertilised sorghum and 
cowpea suggests that an entrepreneur can reduce his exposure by selecting 
commodities with low fertiliser requirements. Equally the selection of commodities 
with low susceptibility to disease and pests will reduce the need for extension advice 
and chemical inputs. Drought tolerance will reduce the risk of crop failure and mass 
default by outgrowers. 
Minimising purchased input costs 
From the scheme operator's perspective, a smallholder's ability to mobilise household 
labour represents the main economic advantage of outgrower arrangements over other 
forms of production. A strategy that maximises this advantage in respect to other 
factors of production is therefore more efficient. It also reduces the value of 
purchased inputs, and, if these are pre-fmanced by the company, its risk. 
Lonrho is piloting minimum tillage among its outgrowers. This promotes manual 
land preparation in the place of ox or tractor ploughing. For the typical smallholder 
who cultivates one or two hectares, this allows him to mobilise family labour for land 
preparation rather than purchase ploughing services. Assuming family labour has a 
low opportunity cost, the smallholder will benefit. In addition, minimum tillage has 
benefits in terms of soil moisture retention (which, given the frequency of droughts in 
Zambia, is of considerable importance) and it encourages early planting which has 
very significant yield advantages. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the low 
input approach results in low yields compared to other leading African producers. In 
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Mali for example, yields averaged 1394 kg/ha compared to 783 kg/ha in Zambia in 
1994. 
It is too early to judge the success or otherwise ofLonrho's strategy. However some 
of broader socio-economic issues that the company will need to take into 
consideration when evaluating the performance of the pilot programme are discussed 
in Section Four. 
More careful use of agrochemicals has been another strategy adopted by Lonrho to 
reduce input costs. The company has used its extension system to educate outgrowers 
about common cotton pests and their natural predators. Outgrowers are taught only to 
apply chemicals when relative numbers of beneficial and malign insects reach certain 
levels. This requires them to monitor (or "scout") fields regularly, but given the high 
cost of chemical inputs, there are considerable savings. 
Asldngfor security 
Some operators have introduced different forms of security into schemes. Following 
a number of seasons in which the company experienced a very high rate of default, for 
the 1995/96 season BIMZI has required its outgrowers to put up collateral, usually in 
the form of livestock. IMPI Agriculture is considering the introduction of a security 
fund for its outgrowers which would require them to put up 10% of the value of the 
inputs pre-financed at the beginning of the season. 
Selecting farmers 
Another strategy to reduce risk is for operators to take care with selecting fanners to 
remove bad risks. As well as asking for collateral from farmers in 1995/96, BIMZI's 
officers visited homesteads to establish their permanency, inspected fields after 
ploughing before fertiliser was delivered, confirmed the farmer's residence through 
the local headman or chief and requested to see his repayment record at other lending 
institutions. The number of farmers who met these criteria were few ( 40) and their 
size of operations averaged 15 ha. Whiterose Farms, which has financed maize as 
well as castor this season, required smallholders to be cultivating a minimum of 3 ha. 
A number of traders receiving funding through the Kabwe Smallholder Programme 
consulted the records of Lima Bank, CUSA and ZCF Financial Services to screen out 
farmers with poor repayment records. 
In Katete, Cotrnark uses a system of elected group leaders to identify and recommend 
farmers for inclusion in its outgrower programme. This system was in operation in 
the area previously under LINTCO. In addition, many of the company's employees 
are former LINTCO officers and are able to use their local knowledge and experience 
to select farmers. 
Lonrho recruits its farmers after harvest, assessing the hectarage it will finance on the 
basis of the family size (a family of 6 is required for 2 ha of cotton). Growers are 
given seed and their performance in the early stages of cultivation is monitored by the 
extension system. It is during this period, before any substantial investment by the 
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company, that the most important assessment of the fanner is made. If he is 
performing well, he will receive chemicals for pest control. 
IMPI Agriculture chose its fanners from among those in an area where there was 
already considerable experience with vegetable production. Fanners were selected 
from 3 villages, all within a short distance of each other, to facilitate monitoring and 
supervision. Selection of individual farmers was based on an assessment of their 
performance over the previous three years which was known to the company's 
director through his previous work in the area. 
Limiting membership but extending hectarage 
Once an entrepreneur has identified a reliable fanner, a cost effective means of 
increasing total output might be to encourage an outgrower to extend his area rather 
than incur all the transaction costs of identifying a new farmer. Whiterose Farms has 
found that its outgrowers tend to be smallholders with a slightly higher than average 
hectarage of between 20 and 30 ha, as these are the fanners who are most prepared to 
diversify out of maize. To expand its operations, the company intends to encourage 
these existing farmers to increase their production of castor rather than bring in new 
ones. 
A weeding out process has produced similar results at BIMZI. With the introduction 
of the new screening criteria discussed above, numbers of farmers participating in the 
scheme have dropped from several hundred to only 40. But the 40 left in the scheme 
are all emergent farmers, not smallholders (taken to mean farmers with less than five 
ha). 
For commodities with a high labour input, a strategy based on maximising household 
labour limits the unit of operation. Hence Lonrho's continuing commitment to the 
smallest fanners. 
3.3 Intensive monitoring of participants 
The management function of scheme participants has two aspects: to provide 
extension and support and to monitor the development and harvesting of the crop up 
until the time it is purchased by the company. The intensity of the first function 
should vary with the commodity itself and the degree of experience that outgrowers 
have in producing it, whilst the intensity of the second function should increase at 
harvest time especially for commodities where there are many competing buyers. 
In Zambia Lonrho has the most highly developed extension and monitoring system, 
based on the World Bank's Training and Visit system. The Regional Manager is 
responsible for an area of25,000 ha which is divided into three zones. Under the 
three zone managers are 11 centres of 725 ha managed by an extension officer and 
under each of these, there are four sub centre extension officers responsible for about 
180 ha each. Farmers within the sub centre area cultivate approximately 2 ha each 
and are organised, usually by village, into groups of ten. These groups receive a visit 
every fortnight from the extension assistants. 
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Extension officers and assistants are supplied with bicycles. Their role is to distribute 
seed and chemicals, conduct extension work, distribute packing materials and buy the 
crop when it is harvested. They receive regular training and are paid incentive 
bonuses for high yields. 
The system appears to operate well. Loan recovery is 93% and Lonrho's confidence 
in the cotton subsector has led it to buy LINTCO, extending the area it is managing 
from 25,000 ha to 65,000 (although as noted above, its new strategy is to contract out 
the management of outgrowers). 
Key elements of the system are the regular contact of extension officers with farmers 
(this is especially critical at harvest time when officers collect bales of cotton directly 
from farmers to ensure there are no side sales); the group approach (see below) which 
encourages self-monitoring by farmers; careful selection and training of extension 
officers; incentive payments for high yields; regular reporting by extension officers to 
their supervisors and a system of forward work plans which allows supervisors to 
check up on those under them. 
Cotmark operates a similar system for its 2,400 farmers with 6 depot buyers operating 
under its two zone extension managers. However the 200 farmers under each depot 
buyer are organised slightly differently: they are divided into 4 areas and each area is 
visited once a week by the depot buyer who holds a meeting with the farmers as well 
as visiting individual farmers. Farmers representatives also play a more active role in 
the scheme's management. Each area has an elected committee and the four areas 
elect a group leader to represent them. As already indicated, the group leaders are 
involved in the selection of farmers for the scheme and are expected by the company 
to play a monitoring role as well. They are provided with bicycles to assist them in 
this work and an incentive bonus for high recovery rates. Once a month they meet 
together with the company for which they receive a sitting allowance. 
Cotmark's eo-option of farmer leaders is based on the LINTCO model which was 
introduced in 1990. The strength ofthe approach lies in the way it internalises local 
knowledge and the influence oflocalleaders to further the interests of the company. 
On the other hand, the group leader's role in the selection process invests him with 
considerable power over his fellow farmers, making the system vulnerable to abuse at 
the hands of unscrupulous leaders. The Lonrho system, which relies entirely on its 
own employees to select farmers (who in turn are regularly monitored by their 
supervisors), is more transparent and may therefore be less open to abuse. Field level 
supervisors are recruited from outside a given locality to ensure impartiality. 
The Lonrho system does use self-monitoring by farmers, though the emphasis is on 
groups rather than group leaders. Self monitoring through groups has also been used 
by Nyondo Enterprises and Bangana Limited, which are both receiving funding under 
the Kabwe Smallholders Programme and by IMPI Agriculture in Chipata. 
Interestingly, Bangana has used groups based on family networks rather than 
geographical location. Another interesting variation on the group theme used by IMPI 
Agriculture is to involve groups of farmers in extension visits as this encourages 
competition among farmers and improves their performance 
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In addition to using farmer to farmer extension, IMP! Agriculture has eo-opted 
Ministry extension officers to work for the company. The same approach has been 
adopted by Advance Seed Limited and a number of the schemes funded by the Kabwe 
Smallholder Programme. As all these schemes are in the first year of operation, it is 
too soon to assess the success of this approach. A key factor may be the additional 
incentives the private company offers to extension officers to work on its behalf. 
Another aspect of monitoring is to ensure that as soon as farmers are ready to harvest, 
all necessary inputs and services are in place for purchasing. IMP! Agriculture 
anticipates that it will face considerable competition to purchase sunflower in Lundazi 
district, where it has pre-financed growers this season, because there is an established 
market there for the commodity. By moving in as soon as the harvest is ready, 
announcing a price and supplying its growers with bags, it plans to capture the market 
before any competitors can act. 
Advance Seed Limited plans to adopt a similar strategy, intensifying its presence in 
the area at harvest time and setting up mobile purchasing camps in the different 
localities. To purchase from farmers in remote areas it will hire in additional 
transport. 
3.4 The Agricultural Credit Act 
Since 1995, another loan recovery strategy available to scheme operators is to invoke 
the Agricultural Credit Act. This gives the lender the right to take legal action against 
a farmer who violates his contract (provided it is drawn up in compliance with Part Ill 
of the Act). It also allows for legal action to be taken against a third party who 
purchases a commodity from a farmer in violation of a previously signed contract. 
The attitudes of scheme operators interviewed during the course of this research on 
the usefulness of the law varied considerably. Advance Seed Limited and Cotmark 
have given it considerable emphasis when recruiting farmers. In the Monze area, 
where Advanced Seed operates, many farmers have witnessed the severe measures 
takep. by Lima Bank this season to recover assets from indebted farmers and the 
company believes that this has provided an effective deterrent. Cotmark has educated 
farmers' group leaders on the Act and is encouraging them to threaten farmers caught 
diverting sales with legal action. On the other hand Lonrho's General Manager 
believes the Act is unenforceable and therefore of limited use. He believes a far more 
effective deterrent to defaulters is "blacklisting", exclusion from the scheme in future 
years 
The coming harvesting season will be the first in which the Act will apply and will be 
an important test of its efficacy. On a more practical note, if scheme operators do 
want to use the Act they must ensure that contracts comply with the law. A number of 
contracts examined during this research failed to include all the information required 
by the law and would not therefore be enforceable. 
3.5 The Consensual Approach 
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All of the strategies so far discussed attempt to control the outgrower and/or limit the 
risk facing the scheme operator. Another approach is for the entrepreneur to build up 
a good relationship with the outgrower in which both parties recognise the mutual 
benefits of co-operation. Adequate incentives, in the form of payments and other 
benefits, as well as good communication between scheme operators and outgrowers, 
play a central role in this process. This approach is not an alternative to effective 
supervision but complementary. 
Prompt and fair payment 
Ensuring that the farmer receives a fair and timely return for his labour is fundamental 
to the success of any scheme. If payments are not made quickly (preferably in cash on 
delivery) or are below the price offered by another trader in the area, the company 
may experience severe difficulties in purchasing the crop. 
An extreme example of this is provided by a tobacco outgrower scheme in Serenje 
district. In 1995 payments to farmers for output delivered in May were delayed until 
November due to a number of managerial problems. Farmers' confidence in the 
ability of the company to purchase appears to have been so damaged by this 
experience that this season they are selling tobacco to local fishermen who purchase 
small amounts of the commodity at a price that is allegedly only a sixth the price 
offered by the company. 
Delayed payments were one of the factors that undermined LINTCO's position in the 
face of competition from Lonrho prior to the take-over this year. Lonrho, which as an 
international trading company is able to draw on external sources of financing, was 
able to pay farmers much more promptly than the parastatal. Under its present 
system, Lonrho farmers are paid within 14 days of procurement. 
IMPI Agriculture intends to pay cash to its producers this season given the 
competition for purchases that it anticipates especially in Lundazi where there is an 
established marketing system for sunflower. 
Having the working capital available to pay producers on delivery is a major expense 
for scheme operators, especially if, unlike Lonrho, they have to borrow from domestic 
banks where interest rates are upwards of 50%. As the Managing Director at Cheetah 
Zambia commented, whilst he can source finance from external and donor sources for 
capital investment, access to working capital from abroad is much more difficult to 
find. His buyers in Europe will not pre-finance him as they only pay on delivery. He 
therefore either has to incur the additional expense of high cost local borrowing, or, if 
he pays producers only after he has sold the crop, risk losing the commodity to 
another buyer. 
A further aspect of this problem is that the price offered by the scheme operator is 
usually given net of repayments. Thus another trader, who has not pre-financed 
inputs, is able to offer a price well in excess of this, encouraging the farmer, who may 
not be very clear about the value ofthe inputs or cost of the services he has received 
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from the scheme, to think that he is not being offered a fair price and is justified in 
selling elsewhere. 
Lonrho attempts to get around this problem by offering a gross price. The cost of all 
inputs used by the farmer is then deducted. Though the average farmer is no better off 
under these arrangements, Lonrho management believes that the strategy has a 
psychological effect which reduces side sales. 
Of course it should be noted that Lonrho's influence on prices restricts the amount of 
room for traders to vary these anyway. It also allows them to operate a price setting 
policy based on costs of production plus a margin for the farmer rather than one which 
is linked to the world price, which is highly volatile. In this way the company 
minimises the price variation for the farmer which it believes facilitates effective 
management. This same approach is favoured by IMPI Agriculture, though whether it 
will work in a much more competitive environment remains to be seen. 
Farmer participation 
Group mobilisation was discussed above in relation to monitoring systems. Groups, 
and their elected representatives, also provide a communication channel between 
farmers and the company's management. 
In the Cotmark example, depot buyers are regularly in contact with group leaders and 
each month all the group leaders meet with the regional manager. IMPI Agriculture 
has encouraged its farmers to elect representatives to form a farmer committee in each 
of its two operational areas. These are in regular contact with the extension officers 
and meet with the company's manager every fortnight. 
Consultation with farmers representatives was crucial for the Tobacco Development 
Company in Chipata, which manages an outgrower scheme of 400 outgrowers at 
Kapara, in finding a solution to the problem of tobacco purchasing. Rather than 
impose a system on the farmers, they discussed the problem with their representatives 
and an agreed approach was successfully implemented. At the other tobacco scheme 
visited in Serenje, farmers are not organised and there is no evidence of any 
consultation with their representatives. Management therefore has no means of 
listening to their concerns, a factor which may be contributing to the difficulty it is 
having in purchasing tobacco. 
The Lonrho scheme does not make any provision for farmer representation. Though 
groups are used at the farm level to facilitate the dissemination of extension messages, 
they do not elect leaders to interact with management at a higher level. The extension 
system itself, and regular field days, do provide management with important links at 
the grassroots, but a more formalised system of farmer representation might provide 
management with an opportunity to keep its outgrowers informed as well as answer 
any concerns they might have. In March 1996 a number issues appeared to be of 
concern to farmers including the price for raw cotton offered by Lonrho (which in 
dollar terms was the same as the two previous years), the withdrawal of tractor 
services, difficulty in obtaining agrochemicals and the new policy of devolved 
management. Senior management was able to provide this researcher with reasonable 
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answers to all these concerns but, in the absence of a system of farmer representation, 
it may be difficult to communicate the same reassurance to the grassroots. 
Access to other benefits 
By offering them other benefits and services, scheme operators can increase the 
incentives for outgrowers to co-operate. 
The strategy described by BIMZI's manager involves offering carefully selected 
farmers a package of services. The company claims that it is also a strategy to identify 
serious farmers with whom a working relationship based on mutual obligations and 
responsibilities can be developed over time. Outgrowers in the scheme are now 
receiving extension services in addition to input supply and marketing services, the 
company will supply farmers with bags and a sheller has been made available this 
season. In the future the company is considering assisting in crop storage by 
managing small storage facilities in rural areas for outgrowers. 
The strategy is intensive in supervision and extension costs. To offset these costs the 
company will encourage outgrowers to diversify output next year, planting a legume 
(soya, cowpeas), an oil crop (sunflower, castor oil, sesame) and possibly paprika in 
addition to maize. Some of these crops are already grown in small quantities by 
farmers. 
The Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) is considering using 
out growers to supply about 25% of the maize it will require to supply its new mill at 
Munkumpu Farms, a newly purchased estate which will grow 2,500 ha irrigated 
winter wheat combined with rain-fed maize and soya in the summer. Well aware of 
the risks involved in operating outgrower schemes, CDC is considering combining 
tight supervision with enhanced food security for its outgrowers: the mill will hold 
stocks of maize for sale to outgrowers at cost price if market prices rise sharply. 
The Tobacco Development Corporation plans to take a slightly different approach. It 
is considering providing free storage facilities for outgrowers who want to store their 
own maize crop in order to take advantage of price rises later in the season. It will 
also prefinance a limited area of maize production. The tobacco scheme at Serenje 
presently does the same. 
4. Constraints to the establishment of successful schemes: (2) Socio-economic 
issues 
Field research indicated that a number of socio-economic issues are influencing the 
establishment of outgrower schemes. The most important is the Zambian 
smallholder's continuing prioritisation of maize production over other crops. To 
some extent this reflects the importance attached to food over cash crop production 
and is therefore consistent with patterns of smallholder behaviour elsewhere in Africa. 
But it is also the product of an agricultural system in Zambia which until recently 
promoted a policy of maize monoculture to the exclusion of not only cash crops but 
traditional food crops more adapted to certain agro-climatic zones. For example in 
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Eastern Zambia, groundnuts used to be a very important food and traded crop but in 
recent years production has collapsed. 
With regard to outgrower arrangements, the high priority attached to maize production 
among smallholders has had two effects: (i) it has encouraged the diversion of 
fertiliser to maize, affecting yields; and (ii) it has reduced labour availability where 
labour requirements are in competition with maize. In both cases the net result has 
been to slow down the process of agricultural diversification. 
The diversion of fertiliser to maize production was a problem facing almost all 
scheme operators. The General Manager of Cotrnark who used to be a senior manager 
with LINTCO, commented that in one year when Lintco supplied smallholders with 
fertiliser, only 3 in 80 used it on the cotton crop. BIMZI estimates that in their first 
year of operation, 90% of the fertiliser supplied to outgrowers for sorghum production 
was used for maize. 
As noted above, in the tobacco schemes in Chipata and Serenje managers are tackling 
the diversion problem by supplying fertiliser for household maize production as well 
as for tobacco. For cotton, as noted in Section Two, Lonrho has taken the opposite 
approach: rather than risk diversion, it does not supply any fertiliser at all. Similarly 
Advance Seed Company only supplies its sorghum and cowpea growers with seed as 
do several of the traders in the Kabwe area who are promoting sunflower. Southern 
Oils, which has been working with outgrowers for a number of years, does the same. 
The implication is that it is still financially viable for scheme operators to promote 
outgrower production in these commodities despite low yields i.e. the cost structures 
are such that they can support relatively extensive production systems involving many 
growers producing at low levels of efficiency. By contrast tobacco production has to 
be intensive to ensure an acceptable marketing quality and this requires significant 
quantities of fertiliser. Paprika is the same. 
At the same time Lonrho has a number of strategies to mitigate the impact of lower 
yields resulting from low fertiliser use. It encourages farmers to do maize/cotton 
rotations to make use of residual fertiliser in the soil after a maize crop (of course this 
begs _the question as to how the smallholder acquires fertiliser for maize production in 
the first place: government lending institutions and the SGS/Cavmont scheme may 
have played a role up until now, but to what extent these sources of assistance will be 
available in the future is an open question). The company also puts a lot of extension 
effort into weed control, given the significant negative impact of weeds on yields and 
it encourages women to grow small plots of cotton (about a quarter of a hectare) 
around the household compound as the yields from such plots tend to be much higher 
than average due to the intensity of crop management and higher soil fertility. 
Unlike Lonrho, Lintco did supply fertiliser to growers for cotton but it also introduced 
soya in rotation with cotton to improve soil fertility. Cotrnark, which employs a 
number of former Lintco staff, is keen to carry on promoting legume/cotton rotations 
both for its positive impact on cotton yields and because it believes that soya, which is 
a labour intensive commodity, has outgrower potential and good export markets in 
South Africa. 
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Clearly maize preference and its influence on fertiliser usage is having a significant 
impact on the design of schemes, although the nature of the impact varies with the 
type of commodity. Where yield advantages can either be offset with more extensive 
production or rotations that compensate to some degree for fertiliser use, scheme 
operators prefer not to supply fertiliser. However where intensive use of fertiliser is 
required, scheme operators have to provide additional fertiliser to guarantee that 
adequate levels reach the target commodity. In both cases it is likely that production 
efficiency is reduced which has implications for the successful development of a more 
diversified agricultural base in Zambia. 
With regard to issues of labour allocation, a commodity which requires labour input at 
the same time as maize may not receive the optimum level of attention. For example 
late planting or insufficient weeding may reduce yields. Table I indicates that many of 
the crops currently being attempted on outgrower schemes follow similar cycles to 
maize and are relatively labour intensive. Cowpea offers advantages in that it is 
harvested in March, before the maize crop is ready and sorghum one established 
competes well against weeds, reducing the need for intensive weeding. On the other 
hand, cotton is highly labour intensive and, as Lonrho introduces minimum tillage on 
its schemes, will become even more so, given the increased weed problem. Soya is 
labour intensive at harvest. 
Given that it is often women who are responsible for weeding and harvesting, the 
introduction of labour intensive commodities which compete with maize for labour is 
likely to impact more on the labour demands made on women than on men. More 
research is required to establish what the impact of this will be in the Zambian 
context, but experience elsewhere suggests that it might affect the efficient 
development of new production systems (Stringfellow, 1996). It is clear that those 
promoting outgrower schemes need to understand prevailing patterns of household 
labour allocation before making large investments in new production systems. 
5. Conclusions 
The evidence presented in Sections 3 and 4 suggests that the development of 
successful outgrower schemes in Zambia has required a flexible and often significant 
management input. The intensity of this input can be seen as a function of two sets of 
variables: the cropping or production characteristics of the commodity; and the 
marketing environment. A third set of variables relating to the socio-economic 
characteristics of the smallholder community itselfhave been shown to influence the 
design of management systems. 
Within the set of cropping characteristics, factors which will increase the intensity of 
management input are high husbandry requirements and high purchased input 
requirements relative to output value. With regard to the marketing environment, 
factors are the degree to which the commodity is consumed, processed and traded 
locally as well as the degree to which marketing systems exist for extra-regional or 
export trade. 
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This analysis can be used to develop a very simple tool to assist pre-feasibility studies 
of proposed outgrower schemes. First of all, the aspiring investor should be able to 
provide sufficient information to answer the following yes/no questions about the 
marketing environment: 
Table 2: Determining the "diversion rating" 
Question Yes (scores 1) No (scores 0) 
Is it edible? 
Is it processed locally for household/local 
use? 
Is it traded locally? 
Does the marketing infrastructure already 
exist for extra-regional or export trade? 
TOTAL SCORE 
The higher the score, the greater the likelihood of diversion of sales. This can be 
considered the "diversion rating". 
Next the ratio of costs (inputs and extension which the scheme operator proposes to 
prefmance) relative to the value of the expected yield needs to be calculated. This 
was attempted in Table 1 for commodities for which sufficient information was 
collected in Zambia. It can be considered the "exposure ratio". 
In Table 3 an attempt is made to bring together the diversion rating and exposure ratio 
for the conunodities given in Table 1.5 
Table 3: Diversion ratings and exposure ratios for selected commodities 
low diversion medium high diversion rating 
rating diversion 
rating 
low exposure ratio castor cotton sunflower and cowpea (without 
(without fertiliser) 
fertiliser) 
high exposure ratio paprika cotton (with hybrid maize 
fertiliser) sunflower, soya and cowpea 
tobacco (with fertiliser) 
----- -
If a commodity comes out with a high "diversion likelihood" rating and a high ratio of 
prefinanced costs relative to the expected value of output ("exposure ratio"), it is 
unlikely to be a good investment. The cost of supervising such a scheme to minimise 
diversion to an acceptable level would be difficult to offset against the gross returns 
from the scheme. The SGS/Cavmont scheme illustrates the difficulty of achieving 
success under these conditions with hybrid maize. 
5 It should be emphasised that in a dynamic situation these ratings (which should only provide a guide) 
can change quite rapidly. Furthermore, this analysis is only concerned with one aspect of a proposed 
investment, that is the extent to which commodity features might influence management systems and 
costs. There are other important issues that an investor should consider, not least the strength and 
reliability of the market for the commodity itself. 
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A scheme to produce a commodity which has a high diversion likelihood rating but a 
low exposure ratio has a better chance of success. The schemes developed for a 
number of food commodities by traders and processors fall into this category. As 
Table 1 indicates, by limiting his/her service simply to the supply of seed, a scheme 
operator can keep the risk exposure level below 10%. He/she will still need to invest 
in an efficient collection system at harvest to ensure sufficient volumes of the 
commodity are recovered to cover the initial investment, and this is likely to be even 
more the case as local marketing systems develop under liberalisation. On the other 
hand if the commodity is self-pollinated (as is the case with cowpeas and soya), as 
production becomes established in an area, farmers will be able to produce their own 
seed and their need for production support will be much less. Thus it is likely that the 
existence of outgrower schemes at the moment for these crops represents a transition 
strategy adopted by traders, necessitated by the poor availability of seed for new food 
crops after years of maize monoculture and the more recent droughts. In the longer 
term these arrangements may disappear. 
Crops with a low diversion and exposure ratio should represent the most secure 
investment. At present castor appears to be the only commodity falling into this 
category in Zambia. It is not edible or widely traded and is a low cost, low 
management commodity. On the other hand, these features make it a commodity with 
low entry costs for investors and in a dynamic situation as more producers and traders 
emerge, marketing might become far more competitive. Thus though market leaders 
may initially do very well, competition may rapidly reduce profits. 
Table 1 suggests that paprika is an example of a commodity with a low diversion 
rating but a relatively high exposure ratio. Although it is a high value commodity, an 
investor's prefinancing costs are driven by the commodity's high input and extension 
requirements, which are further increased by the fact that paprika is a new commodity 
in Zambia and therefore requires a greater extension effort. Given this, a potential 
investor would have to be in a position to take a long term view of his/her investment 
to offset initially high start up costs against income from future years. The high level 
of risk involved also requires the investor to safeguard the investment with effective 
management systems. As the evidence of field work presented in Section 3 
demonstrates, an investor can use a number of complementary strategies to achieve 
this: (i) strict screening and monitoring of scheme participants (which may include 
peer group monitoring); (ii) risk sharing; (iii) consensus building. 
Cotton and tobacco have much in common with paprika except that the risk of sales 
diversion is higher, given that they are established commodities in Zambia. Lomho's 
management strategy for cotton has been to focus on strict monitoring and risk 
sharing, which it is attempting by passing on a higher proportion of production costs 
to the producer through the substitution of purchased inputs (which it would have to 
prefinance) for the smallholders' labour input. 
This option does not exist for tobacco and paprika which require high fertiliser inputs. 
Developing an alternative approach is the main challenge facing those who want to 
work with outgrowers to produce labour and capital intensive commodities. 
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Institutional mechanisms are required which reinforce the mutual interest that the 
buyer and the smallholder have in co-operation. A consensual approach to 
management, elements of which are described in Section 3, is crucial (although this 
does not remove the need for careful screening and monitoring). In addition, an 
investor might find it well worth investing in improving the business understanding of 
smallholders or their representatives, allowing a more transparent dialogue about the 
business contract. Where this creates sufficient trust, smallholders might be induced 
to put up some of the capital required for production themselves, thus spreading the 
prefmancing risk between the two parties. It is worth noting that in Zambia, IMPI 
Agriculture, which has attached great importance to developing good working 
relationships with its growers and their elected representatives, is already considering 
asking its growers to contribute to a security fund. 
In the long term, the importance of outgrower arrangements as an institution in 
Zambian agriculture will depend on the ability of investors to develop the kind of 
"business partnerships" sketched out above. Donors may be able to assist in this 
process by providing technical assistance and training for farmer organisations and by 
assisting in the design of financing systems which spread the prefmancing risk 
between the smallholder, investor and a financial institution. Venture capital funds 
may also assist new investors should the conservatism of the commercial banking 
system block new investments. In the short and medium term, outgrower schemes 
requiring a much lower commitment of resources by investors may continue to play 
an important role in promoting agricultural diversification in Zambia. However as the 
marketing infrastructure develops for these commodities - both for seed supply and 
for output marketing - the rationale for these schemes will disappear and traders and 
processors will be able to rely on open market procurement. 
31 
References 
Mano Consultancy Services Ltd. Study of Outgrower Schemes in Zambia (draft), 
September 1995 
Stringfellow, R. An investigation of the organisational features; commodities and 
situations associated with contract farming and outgrower schemes in Sub Saharan 
Africa and of the factors which are critical to their successful operation, Research 
Report,. February 1996, NRI, UK 
UNDP/GRZIFAO Proceedings of the Workshop on Rural Food Commodity 
Traders and Food Security, 14th September 1995, Lusak~ Zambia 
The Zambian Farmer, February 1996, Volume I Number 3, Lusa.ka,.Zambia 
32 
Appendix One 
Terms of Reference 
1. To provide an overview of the state of smallholder outgrower schemes in Zambia. 
2. To investigate the extent to which the diversion of sales by outgrowers is hindering 
the establishment of successful outgrower schemes in Zambia and the strategies 
adopted by entrepreneurs in response to this problem. 
3. To investigate the degree to which socio-economic issues have influenced the 
outcome of schemes. 
4. To identify ways of disseminating relevant research findings to interested parties in 
Zambia. 
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Appendix Two 
List of those interviewed during the course of fieldwork 
Dr George Gray, Executive Director, Zambian National Fanners Union, Taz House, 
ChaChaCha Road, P.O.Box 30395, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Songowayo Zyambo, National Co-ordinator, Zambian National Fanners Union, 
Taz House, ChaChaCha Road, P.O.Box 30395, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Andrew Fletcher, General Manager, Agricultural Commodity Exchange Ltd., Taz 
House, Chiparamba Road, P 0 Box 30395, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr David Soroko, Chief, Office of Agriculture, USAID, 351 Independence Avenue, 
Box 32481, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Neil Molver, Managing Director, Lonrho Zambia Ltd., P 0 Box 322568, Lusaka, 
Zambia 
Mr Ginty Melvill, General Manager, Lonrho Agribusiness, Cotton Division, Lonrho 
Zambia Ltd., P 0 Box 322568, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Roy Mutelele, Zone Extension Manager, Mumbwa Cotton Ginnery Ltd, Lonrho 
Zambia Ltd., P 0 Box 830195, Mumbwa, Zambia 
Dr Joyce Mulila, National Project Director, Integrated Crop Management/Crop 
Legumes Project, UNDP/GRZ/F AO, 
Dr Frank Javaheri, Integrated Crop Management/Crop Legumes Project, 
UNDP/GRZ/F AO 
Mr Dieter Fischer, Project Manager, Oilseed Processing Project, Africare, 87 
Provident Street, off Great East Road near Makishi, P 0 Box 36658, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr T Constantinou, Southern Oil Mills Ltd., P 0 Box 32655, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mrs Mulenga Maine, Whiterose Fann c/o ZNFU, Taz House, ChaChaCha Road, 
P.O.Box 30395, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Aldert van der Vinne, Managing Director, Tobacco Association of Zambia, Plot 
5055 Mungwi Road, P 0 Box 32617, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Yakub Daya, Manager, Zambia and Overseas Tobacco Co. Ltd, P 0 Box 510454, 
Chipata, Zambia 
Mr Robert Zulu, Accountant, Zambia and Overseas Tobacco Company Ltd., P 0 Box 
510454, Chipata, Zambia 
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Mr Douglas Mwasi, Credit Supervisor, Agricultural Credit Management Programme, 
SGS Zambia Ltd, 
Mrs. C. Mwanamwamba, Managing Director, BIMZI Ltd., P 0 Box 50514, Lusaka, 
Zambia 
Mr Julius Mumba, Agricultural Manager, BIMZI Ltd., P 0 Box 50514, Lusaka, 
Zambia 
Mr Emest Mtamboh, Executive, Commonwealth Development Corporation, 74 
Independence A venue, P 0 Box 32000, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Frank Joosten, Kabwe Smallholders Development Programme, Central Province, 
P 0 Box 8 11 10, Kabwe, Zambia 
Mr Willis Simfukwe, Kabwe Smallholders Development Programme, Central 
Province, P 0 Box 8 11 10, Kabwe, Zambia 
Mr Norman Chipakupaku, IMP! Agriculture Ltd 
Mr Netson Simbaya, Advance Seed Company Ltd, c/o Amanita Zambiana, P 0 Box 
33711, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Stephen Humphrey, Chief Executive, Zambia Export Growers' Association, P 0 
Box 31705, ZEGA Terminal, Airfreight Village, Lusaka International Airport, 
Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Mark Turken, Managing Director, Cheetah Zambia Ltd, P 0 Box 36666, 10101 
Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Joe Nkole, Operations Manager, Cotmark Limited, 
Mr Richard Tembo, R_.egional Manager, Cotmark Limited 
Mrs Susan Kannyemba, Assistant Marketing Officer, Clark Cotton Zambia 
Mr Jones A Mayovu, Manager, Barclays Bank, Katete, Eastern Province 
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Appendix Three 
Questionnaire for Companies Operating Outgrower Schemes 
1. Basic Data 
1.1 What commodity is produced under outgrower arrangements? 
1.2 What are the main activities in the outgrower operation? 
1.3 How many farmers are participating in the scheme? 
1.4 What is the typical profile of a scheme participant 
1.5 Does the company produce the commodity itself on a nucleus estate? 
1.6 In general terms, why did the company choose to work with outgrowers? 
2. Factors Influencing the Scheme's Design 
2.1 Site selection 
Why was the particular site selected for the scheme (farmers' experience with the 
crop; proximity to marketing infrastructure; natural resource base etc.)? 
2.2 Commodity selection 
Why was the particular commodity chosen (comparative advantage in cost of 
production; off season production provides market opportunity; local knowledge of 
the crop; non edible crop; no local demand for the crop; appropriate agronomic 
conditions)? 
2.3 Farmer participation 
What information was collected on the target participants during the design process? 
How was this done? (would labour be available at the required times; would it be 
provided by men or women? what would the opportunity costs be for farmers 
participating in the scheme; what impact would the new crop be likely to have on 
food production; to what degree would the existing farming system be able to 
withstand increased risk?) 
3. The Management of Outgrowing Operations 
3.1 Farmers 
3 .1.1 Are any selection criteria applied to prospective scheme participants? 
3 .1.2 Is there a monitoring system in operation on the scheme? If so, describe. What 
records are kept on each farmer? 
3 .1.3 Does the scheme provide extension services? How are these organised? 
3.1.4 What communication channels exist between the scheme's management and 
the participating farmers? Are the farmers organised into groups or associations (by 
the company/through their own initiative?) 
3.1.5 Describe the input delivery system. Are inputs supplied on credit? Does the 
company give credit for anything else? Is any security asked for loans? Is any kind of 
credit register in use? 
3 .1.6 Describe the purchasing system. 
3.1.7 How and when are farmers paid? 
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3 .1.8 How are loans recovered? 
3.1.9 In addition to the opportunity to produce the target commodity itself, does the 
scheme offer any other benefits to participants? 
3 .1.1 0 Are written contracts in use? 
3. 2. Administrative/extension teams 
3 .2.1 How many administrative/extension personnel are employed by the company? 
3.2.2 How are administrative/extension teams recruited? What 
qualifications/experience do they have? 
3.2.3 How are they monitored? 
3.2.4 What training is provided to extension agents/administrative personnel? 
3.2.5 What communication systems exist between the company management and 
administrative/ extension personnel? 
3.2.6 What rewards systems are in operation for administrative/extension personnel? 
4. Market Considerations 
4.1 What market advantage does the commodity have? 
4.2 How stable is the market? (does the company have a contract with a buyer? does 
the company monitor the performance of its buyer?) 
4.3 What are the scheme' s sources of market information? How did the company 
identify its present buyer? Does it know of any alternative buyers? Does the scheme 
collect information on competitors? 
4.4 Does the company operate any kind of sensitivity analysis to model the impact of 
changes in key factors affecting its operations? 
5. Indicators of Scheme Success 
5.1 Has the scheme achieved its target output levels ( in terms of quantity, quality 
and timeliness) 
5.2 What are loan repayment levels by outgrowers? 
5.3 Has the number of farmers participating in the scheme increased over time? 
5.4 Does the company have plans to expand its operations? Has it received any 
loan~ recently for this purpose? 
6. Problems 
6.1 What have been the main problems encountered by the scheme? How have they 
been resolved? 
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